In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as su¢ cient conditions for which the e¢ cient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games. JEL classi…cation codes: C70; C71; D62.
Introduction
This paper examines the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games. In economic environments with positive spillovers or externalities such as Cournot oligopolies, public goods economies, and common pool resource economies, the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in which all players form one coalition is rarely a stable outcome in myopic notions of stability such as -stability, -stability, -stability, and -stability (see Hart and Kurz (1983) and Herings et al. (2010) ). On the other hand, if coalition members are farsighted in that they consider the possibility that deviations might be countered by subsequent deviations, then the e¢ cient grand coalition structure becomes stable in farsighted notions of stability in these economic games. Herings et al. (2010) showed that the singleton set consisting of only the e¢ cient grand coalition structure is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set introduced by Chwe (1994) and a farsightedly stable set due to Herings et al. (2010) in coalition formation games with positive spillovers. Moreover, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) established that the e¢ cient grand coalition structure always belongs to the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994) , and the largest cautious consistent set, a re…nement of the largest consistent set they proposed, singles out the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in those games. 1 In these previous studies on farsighted coalitional stability, no restriction is imposed on the feasible coalition structures that deviating coalitions can change. For instance, the ine¢ cient singleton coalition structure in which no cooperation among players is formed can be directly changed into the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in which all players cooperate. As Macho-Stadler et al. (2006) pointed out, however, such a merger may not be feasible when there are high negotiation or transaction costs with many players. Actually, mergers of more than two …rms or organizations have been little often observed in comparison with bilateral mergers of two in many practical situations. This is because the costs of merging more than two organizations are much larger than that just between two.
For example, in Japan, all mergers of major banks after 1960 were bilateral and large banks have been formed through sequential processes of bilateral mergers. A typical example is the bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Japan's largest bank. It is the result of a merger between the bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, formerly Japan's secondlargest one, and the UFJ bank, which was Japan's fourth-largest one in 2006. The bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, in turn, was the outcome of a merger of the Tokyo bank and the Mitsubishi bank in 1996, while the UFJ bank was the result of an integration between the Sanwa bank and the Tokai bank in 2002. See also Houston et al. (2001) and Macho-Stadler et al. (2006) for various examples of bilateral mergers in economic environments.
In this paper, we investigate the stability of coalition structures when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. More speci…cally, we consider the following de…nition of domination between two coalition structures with farsighted players. The coalition structure P T is said to sequentially dominate the coalition structure P 0 if there is a sequence of coalition structures fP t g T t=0 from P 0 to P T such that at each step t, one of the following holds: (1) Two separate coalitions in P t merge into one coalition in P t+1 and no other change occurs. Each member in the two merging coalitions prefers his/her payo¤s under the …nal coalition structure P T to that under the coalition structure P t before merging; or (2) One coalition in P t breaks up into two separate coalitions in P t+1 and no other change occurs. Each member who leaves the coalition in P t prefers his/her payo¤ under the …nal coalition structure P T to that under the coalition structure P t before breaking up. A coalition structure is said to be sequentially stable if it sequentially dominates all other coalition structures.
Notice that in (2) of the above de…nition of domination, we assume that only one breakup of a coalition into two separate coalitions happens at each negotiation process. This assumption regarding breaking-up of coalitions is a symmetric version of (1) concerning merging. This "step-by-step"approach, which allows only bilateral changes both in merging and in breaking-up at each step, is useful to describe negotiation steps concretely. One might say that a coalition could break up into any number of subcoalitions even with high negotiation costs. However, all of our results for the sequential stability turn out to hold even when any change of coalition structure is possible in breaking-up, whereas only bilateral changes are feasible in merging.
We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure which is applicable to any coalition formation game. We also give su¢ -cient conditions for the grand coalition structure to be sequentially stable in coalition formation games with positive spillovers. As applications, we study common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games. We clarify how the sequential stability of the e¢ cient grand coalition structure depends on the number of players as well as the production function of a common pool resource game. Contrary to the case of no restriction on feasible coalition deviations, the grand coalition structure may not be sequentially stable even among farsighted players when only bilateral mergers of two coalitions are possible. Nevertheless, for each possible number of players, there exists a class of concave production functions for which the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also demonstrate that the e¢ cient grand coalition structure may or may not be sequentially stable depending on the number of players in Cournot oligopoly games with linear demand.
Moreover, we examine what would happen if more than two coalitions could merge into one coalition because of smaller negotiation or transaction costs. We identify how many coalitions should merge into one coalition at each step of sequential domination to make the e¢ cient grand coalition stable in common pool resource games and oligopoly games. We …nd that the merger of all singleton coalitions into the grand coalition is not necessary and a merger of a smaller number of coalitions is su¢ cient for the e¢ cient grand coalition structure to be stable among farsighted players. Macho-Stadler et al. (2006) also considered endogenous coalition formation only through bilateral mergers in the presence of high transaction costs in a Cournot oligopoly. They proposed a particular mechanism of sequential coalition formation and showed that the grand coalition structure is the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of their mechanism if the number of …rms is su¢ ciently large and the discount factor is high enough. However, coalitions are allowed only to merge, but not to break up in their game. Since each coalition has a strong incentive to deviate from the ef…cient grand coalition in a Cournot oligopoly, it may be di¢ cult to achieve e¢ ciency if breakups of coalitions are possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de…ne the sequential stability of coalition structures and compare our notion with a von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set, a farsightedly stable set, and the largest consistent set. Section 2 also provides an algorithm to check the sequential stability and su¢ cient conditions for the grand coalition structure to be sequentially stable. We examine the sequential stability of the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in common pool resource games in Section 3 and in Cournot oligopoly games in Section 4. In Section 5, we extend our stability concept to the case in which more than two coalitions are allowed to merge into one coalition. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures

Notation and De…nitions
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a set of players. A non-empty subset S of N is called a coalition. We use the concept of a coalition structure to express which coalitions players form: a coalition structure P is a partition fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g of N , where S j 6 = ? for i = 1; ::; k, S i \ S j = ? for i 6 = j, and [
The set of partitions of N is denoted by . In particular, P N = fN g is called the grand coalition structure, and P I = ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg is said to be the singleton coalition structure. We assume that given any coalition structure P 2 , the feasible payo¤ vector under P, u(P) = (u 1 (P); u 2 (P); :::; u n (P))2IR n , is uniquely determined. Here u i (P) denotes player i's payo¤ when the coalition structure P is formed. The triple (N; ; (u i ) i2N ) is called a coalition formation game.
We propose the following stability concept of a coalition structure called "sequential stability" for a coalition formation game among farsighted players. Let coalition structures P; P 0 2 with P 6 = P 0 and a coalition Q N with Q 6 = ? be given. We …rst de…ne the obtainable coalition structures that a deviating coalition can enforce: De…nition 1. The coalition structure P 0 is obtainable from P via Q either by a merger of two coalitions or by a breakup into two coalitions if (i) fS
S 2 P; S \ Q 6 = ?g, and (ii) either (a) jP 0 j = jPj 1, Q 2 P 0 , and there are S 1 ; S 2 2 P such that Q = S 1 [ S 2 , or (b) jP 0 j = jPj + 1, Q 2 P 0 , and there are S 2 P and S 0 2 P 0 such that Q = SnS 0 .
Condition (i) in De…nition 1 says that only the players in Q deviate from their respective coalition(s) in P and any non-deviating player in N nQ does not move. Condition (ii) means that either (a) two separate coalitions S 1 and S 2 in P merge into one coalition Q in P 0 , or (b) the players in Q leave their coalition S in P, and S breaks up into two separate coalitions S 0 and Q in P 0 . No other change occurs.
De…nition 2. The coalition structure P sequentially dominates P 0 if there is a …nite sequence of coalition structures fP t g T t=0 such that (1) P 0 = P 0 and P T = P, (2) for any t 2 f0; 1; :::; T 1g, P t+1 is obtainable from P t via some coalition Q either by a merger of two coalitions or by a breakup into two coalitions, and
Condition (2) in De…nition 2 speci…es the restrictions on coalitional changes in the sequence of coalition structures fP t g T t=0 and the requirements on the payo¤s of the deviating coalitions. At each step t in the sequence, one of the following should hold: (a) each member in the coalition Q that is a merger of two coalitions in P t prefers his/her payo¤ under the …nal coalition structure P T to that under P t before merging; or (b) each member in Q who leaves some coalition in P t prefers his/her payo¤ under the …nal coalition structure P T to that under P t before breaking-up.
De…nition 3. The coalition structure P is sequentially stable if for any other coalition structures P 0 6 = P, P sequentially dominates P 0 .
Related Stability Concepts
Many previous studies on coalition formation games have investigated the case of no restriction on feasible coalitional changes:
S 2 P; S \ Q 6 = ?g, and (ii) there exist S 
In this de…nition introduced by Herings et al. (2010) , there is no restriction on the obtainable coalition structures that a deviating coalition can enforce, and all possibilities of re…ning and merging are allowed.
De…nition 5. The coalition structure P indirectly dominates P 0 if there is a …nite sequence of coalition structures fP t g T t=0 such that (1) P 0 = P 0 and P T = P, (2) for any t 2 f0; 1; :::; T 1g, P t+1 is obtainable from P t via some coalition Q and u i (P t ) < u i (P T ) for all i 2 Q.
2 Chwe (1994) introduced the following stability concept by replacing the direct dominance relation with the indirect dominance relation of Harsanyi (1974) in the original de…nition of the stable set due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944):
De…nition 6. The set F is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if 2 A weaker version of indirect dominance has been studied in the literature on farsighted coalitional stability: u i (P t ) < u i (P T ) for some i 2 Q and u i (P t ) u i (P T ) for all i 2 Q (e.g., see Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) and Herings et al. (2010) ). In this de…nition, a coalition can deviate only if at least one of its members becomes better o¤, whereas all other members are at least as well o¤. A weak version of sequential dominance can be de…ned in a similar way. Our results in this paper hold for these weak versions of dominance, too.
(i) internal stability: for any coalition structure P 0 2 F, there is no P 2 F such that P indirectly dominates P 0 ; and (ii) external stability: for any coalition structure P 0 2 = F, there exists P 2 F such that P indirectly dominates P 0 .
The notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set coincides with the notion of Extended EBA (EEBA) due to Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) who extended the concept of Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA) introduced by Ray and Vohra (1997) . Ray and Vohra (1997) assumed that coalitions can only break up into smaller sizes of coalitions, but cannot merge into larger sizes of coalitions, whereas Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) allowed for any coalitional deviations including breaking-up as well as merging. Chwe (1994) proposed the largest consistent set by replacing the internal and external stability conditions of the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set by the conditions that internal and external deviations should be deterred:
De…nition 7. The set F is a consistent set if P 2 F if and only if for all Q N , for all P 0 2 nP such that P 0 is obtainable from P via Q, there exists P 00 2 F such that either (a) P 00 = P 0 or (b) P 00 indirectly dominates P 0 and we do not have u i (P) < u i (P 00 ) for all i 2 Q. The largest consistent set is the consistent set containing any consistent set. Herings et al. (2010) introduced a stability notion to predict which coalition structures are going to emerge in the long run when players are farsighted:
De…nition 8. The set F is a farsightedly stable set if (i) for any P 2 F and any P 0 2 = F such that P 0 is obtainable from P via Q, there exists P 00 2 F such that P 00 indirectly dominates P 0 and we do not have u i (P) < u i (P 00 ) for all i 2 Q; (ii) external stability: for P 0 2 = F, there exists P 2 F such that P indirectly dominates P 0 ; and (iii) there is no F 0 $ F such that F 0 satis…es Conditions (i) and (ii). Herings et al. (2010) showed that a farsightedly stable set always exists, whereas there may be no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Furthermore, they proved the following relationships: Proposition 1. (Herings et al. (2010) ) (i) If F is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set, then it is a farsightedly stable set.
(ii) If fPg is a farsightedly stable set, then P belongs to the largest consistent set.
Suppose that a coalition structure P sequentially dominates any other coalition structure. Then the singleton set consisting of P satis…es the external stability condition in De…nition 6 because sequential domination implies indirect domination. Also, it is obvious that this singleton set satis…es the internal stability condition in De…ni-tion 6. Hence, by Proposition 1, we have the following relationships: Corollary 1. Suppose that P is sequentially stable. Then fPg is a von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set (an EEBA) and a farsightedly stable set. Moreover, P belongs to the largest consistent set. 3 However, the converse is not true: the singleton set consisting of one coalition structure that is not sequentially stable may be a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (an EEBA) and a farsightedly stable set, and the coalition structure may belong to the largest consistent set. In the next subsection, we will give an example illustrating this fact (Example 1) after describing an algorithm to check whether or not the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable.
An Algorithm to Check the Sequential Stability of the Grand Coalition Structure
In this subsection, we give an algorithm to check whether or not the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable. This algorithm can be applied to any coalition formation game.
Let (k) fP 2 : jPj = kg be the set of all coalition structures consisting of k coalitions (k = 1; 2; :::; n) and [ n k=1 (k)be the set of all possible coalition structures. Also, let (k) (k) be the set of coalition structures that are sequentially dominated by P N , which can be found by using the following algorithm (k = 2; 3; :::; n).
Step 1 (Finding (2)): Find coalition structures P such that jPj = 2 and u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 N , and add all such coalition structures to (2). If (2) = ?, then P N is not sequentially stable. (END) Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2:
Step 2-1 (Finding (3)): a) Pick a coalition structure P 2 (2). b) Find every coalition structure P 0 2 (3) from which P is obtainable via S by a merger of two coalitions and u i (P 0 ) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S: Let (3; P) be the set of all coalition structures found in Step b). Repeat a) and b) for every P 2 (2). Let (3) = [ P2 (2) (3; P). If (3) = ?, then P N is not sequentially stable. (END)
Step 2-2 (Expanding (2) through (3)):
Step 2-2, and go to Step 3. Otherwise, pick any coalition structure P 2 (2) n (2).
b) Find a coalition structure P 0 2 (3) which is obtainable from P via S by a breakup into two coalitions and u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S:
If such a coalition structure P 0 exists, add P to (2): Repeat Step a) and Step b) until there is no such coalition structure P 0 for any P 2 (2) n (2).
Then go back to Step 2-1 again to …nd (3) based on P 2 (2) which is newly added. Next go to Step 2-2 again to expand (2). Repeat Steps 2-1 and 2-2 till there are no additional changes on (3) and (2). Then go to Step 3.
. Step 3:
Step 3-1 (Finding (4)): a) Pick a coalition structure P 2 (3). b) Find every coalition structure P 0 2 (4) from which P is obtainable via S by a merger of two coalitions and u i (P 0 ) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S: Let (4; P) be the set of all coalition structures found in Step b). Repeat a) and b) for every P 2 (3). Let (4) = [ P2 (3) (4; P). If (4) = ?, then P N is not sequentially stable. (END)
Step 3-2 (Expanding (3) through (4)):
Step 3-2, and go to Step 4. Otherwise, pick any coalition structure P 2 (3) n (3).
b) Find a coalition structure P 0 2 (4) which is obtainable from P via S by a breakup into two coalitions and u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S: If such a coalition structure P 0 exists, add P to (3): Repeat Step a) and Step b) until there is no such coalition structure P 0 for any P 2 (3) n (3).
Then go back to Step 3-1 again to …nd (4) based on (3). Next go to Step 3-2 again to expand (2). Repeat Steps 3-1 and 3-2 till there are no additional changes on (4) and (3). Then go to Step 3-3.
Step 3-3 (Expanding (2) through (3)): a) If (2) = (2), skip this step, and go to Step 3-5. Otherwise, pick any coalition structure P 2 (2) n (2). b) Find a coalition structure P 0 2 (3) which is obtainable from P via S by a breakup into two coalitions and u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S: Repeat Step a) and Step b) until there is no such coalition structure P 0 for any P 2 (2) n (2). Then go to Step 3-4.
Step 3-4 (Expanding (3) through (2), the same as Step 2-1): a) Pick a coalition structure P 2 (2). b) Find every coalition structure P 0 2 (3) from which P is obtainable via S by a merger of two coalitions and u i (P 0 ) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S: Let (3; P) be the set of all coalition structures found in Step b). Repeat a) and b) for every P 2 (2). Let (3) = [ P2 (2) (3; P).
Repeat
Step a) and Step b) until there is no such coalition structure P 0 for any P 2 (2) n (2).
Then go back to
Step 3-3 again to …nd (2) based on (3). Next go to Step 3-4 again to expand (3). Repeat Steps 3-3 and 3-4 till there are no additional changes on (2) and (3).
Then repeat Steps 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4 (Expanding (4), (3), (2) Step 4:
Step 4-1 (Finding (5) based on (4)).
Step 4-2 (Expanding (4) through (5)), and repetitions of Steps 4-1 and 4-2.
Step 4-3 (Expanding (3) through (4))
Step 4-4 (Expanding (4) through (3)), and repetitions of Steps 4-3 and 4-4.
Step 4-5 (Expanding (2) through (3))
Step 4-6 (Expanding (3) through (2)) and repetitions of Steps 4-5 and 4-6.
Step 4-7 (Expanding (4) through (3))
Step 4-8 (Expanding (3) through (4)) and repetitions of Steps 4-7 and 4-8.
Repeat Steps 4-1,4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, and 4-8. If there are no additional changes in (5), (4) Step 5, Step 6,...,
Step n,
Since this algorithm covers all the possibilities of sequential dominance by the grand coalition structure, we can determine whether or not the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable.
In this algorithm, once (k) = (k) holds for some k = 2; ::; n, the expanding steps of (k) can be omitted after that.
Moreover if we could …nd (k) = (k) for some k = 2; ::; n by some way, we can guarantee the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure by the following simpler check:
Suppose there exists k (2 k n) which satis…es (1) (k) = (k); (2) for any P 2 (l); 2 l < k, there is S 2 P such that jSj 2 and u i (P) < u i (P N ) for some i 2 S; and (3) for any P 2 (l); k < l n, for any S 2 P, u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S. For this case, we can go to Step k directly and skip the other steps, Step l ( 2 l < k ). Then through the sub-steps of Step k, the condition (2) implies that P is sequentially dominated by P N for 2 jPj < k. Moreover through Steps l 1, l = k +1; k +2; :::; n, the condition (3) implies that P is sequentially dominated by P N for k < jPj n. This shows the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure.
As an illustration of the above algorithm, let us examine the following example.
Example 1. Consider a …ve-person game where payo¤s are obtained from a model of an economy with a common pool resource that we will investigate in more detail in Section 3: u i (P) = v(P)= jSj for all S 2 P and all i 2 S, where v(P N ) = 10, v(P 2 ) = 18 for all P 2 with jP 2 j = 2, v(P 3 ) = 8 for all P 3 with jP 3 j = 3, v(P 4 ) = 5 for all P 4 with jP 4 j = 4, and v(P I ) = 3. Figure 1 illustrates every possible coalition structure in which the circle means a coalition and the number in the circle indicates the cardinality of the coalition. The vector under each coalition S indicates their payo¤s, (u i (P)) i2S .
We show that the grand coalition structure P N = f5g is sequentially stable by applying our algorithm. Let us denote a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; :::; S k g, where jS 1 j = r 1 jS 2 j = r 2 jS 3 j = r 3 ::: jS k j = r k , by fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k g. We also indicate a sequence of coalition structures for which P = P T sequentially dominates P 0 = P 0 by P 0 ! P 1 ! P 2 ! ::: ! P T : Step 1. Finding (2): f5g is obtainable from f2; 3g when the two-person coalition and the three-person coalition merge into the grand coalition, and u i (f5g) > u i (f2; 3g) for every player i. Therefore, f2; 3g ! f5g and f2; 3g 2 (2):
Step 2-1(A). Finding (3): f2; 3g 2 (2) is obtainable from f1; 1; 3g when two singleton coalitions merge into the two-person coalition, and u i (f5g) > u i (f1; 1; 3g) for every player i. By this fact and Step 1, f1; 1; 3g ! f2; 3g ! f5g and f1; 1; 3g 2 (3):
Step 2-2(B). Finding (3): f2; 3g 2 (2) is obtainable from f1; 2; 2g when the singleton coalition and one of the two-person coalitions merge into the three-person coalition, and u i (f5g) > u i (f1; 2; 2g) for every player i. By this fact and Step 1, f1; 2; 2g ! f2; 3g ! f5g and f1; 2; 2g 2 (3).
Step 2-2. Expanding (2) through (3): f1; 1; 3g 2 (3) is obtainable from f1; 4g by the deviation of one person from the 4-person coalition, and u i (f5g) > u i (f1; 4g) for each player i in the 4-peron coalition. By this fact and Step 2-1(A), f1; 4g ! f1; 1; 3g ! f2; 3g ! f5g and f1; 4g 2 (2).
Step 3. Finding (4): f1; 1; 3g 2 (3) is obtainable from f1; 1; 1; 2g when one singleton coalition and the two-person coalition merge into the three-person coalition, and u i (f5g) > u i (f1; 1; 1; 2g) for every player i. By this fact and Step 2-1(A), f1; 1; 1; 2g ! f1; 1; 3g ! f2; 3g ! f5g, and f1; 1; 1; 2g 2 (4):
Step 4. Finding (5): f1; 1; 1; 2g 2 (4) is obtainable from f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g when two singleton coalitions merge into the two-person coalition, and u i (f5g) > u i (f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g) for every player i. By this fact and Step 3, f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 2g ! f1; 1; 3g ! f2; 3g ! f5g and f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g 2 (5):
Now we have (k) = (k) for all k = 2; 3; 4; 5, that is, P N = f5g sequentially dominates any other coalition structure.
Moreover, P N is the unique sequentially stable coalition structure. The reason is as follows. First of all, any coalition structure P except for P N and f1; 4g is not sequentially stable because u i (P N ) > u i (P) for all i 2 N , so that P cannot sequentially dominate P N . Second, f1; 4g cannot sequentially dominate f1; 1; 1; 2g. If f1; 4g sequentially dominates f1; 1; 1; 2g, then two coalitions including at least one singleton coalition in f1; 1; 1; 2g should merge at the …rst step. However, no such merger is pro…table for any player in the singleton coalition because his/her payo¤ under f1; 1; 1; 2g is larger than that in the 4-person coalition under f1; 4g. Therefore, f1; 4g is not sequentially stable.
On the other hand, f1; 4g indirectly dominates f1; 1; 1; 2g because the sequence f1; 1; 1; 2g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ! f1; 4g satis…es the requirements of indirect dominance under no restriction on coalitional changes in De…nition 5. Moreover, it is easy to check that f1; 4g indirectly dominates any other coalition structure. Hence, even though f1; 4g is not sequentially stable, the singleton set ff1; 4gg is a von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set (an EEBA) as well as a farsightedly stable set, and f1; 4g belongs to the largest consistent set by Proposition 1. That is, the converse of Corollary 1 is not true.
Su¢ cient Conditions for the Sequential Stability of the Grand Coalition Structure
In the subsequent sections, we examine a class of coalition formation games satisfying the following conditions:
De…nition 9. Equal sharing: for any P 2 , any S 2 P, and any i; j 2 S, u i (P) = u j (P).
De…nition 10. Negative Association: for any P 2 and any S; T 2 P, jSj < jT j if and only if u i (P) > u j (P) for any i 2 S and any j 2 T:
De…nition 11. Positive Spillovers: for any P; P 0 2 with jPj < jP 0 j, any S 2 P\P 0 , and any i 2 S, u i (P) > u i (P 0 ).
De…nition 12. E¢ ciency: for any P 2 with P 6
Equal sharing means that the value of any coalition in any coalition structure is shared equally, implying that players are symmetric or identical. Negative association says that the per-member payo¤ becomes lower as the size of a coalition grows larger in any coalition structure. Positive spillovers implies that the formation of a coalition by other players increases the payo¤ of a player. E¢ ciency means that the grand coalition structure is the only e¢ cient coalition structure maximizing the sum of payo¤s over all players.
Coalition formation games in economic situations satisfying these four conditions include cartel formation games in Cournot oligopolies (e.g., Bloch (1996) and Yi (1997) ), public good provision games (e.g., Yi (1997) ), and common pool resource games (e.g., Funaki and Yamato (1999) ). Herings et al. (2010) showed that under the four conditions, the grand coalition structure P N indirectly dominates any other coalition structure under no restriction on coalitional changes, implying that the singleton set consisting of P N is a von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable set (an EEBA). The set fP N g is also farsightedly stable and P N belongs to the largest consistent set by Proposition 1. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) studied a class of games satisfying the above four conditions as well as the individual free-riding condition: for any P 2 , any S 2 P, and any i 2 S, u i (PnfSg[fSnfig; figg) > u i (P). They proved that if for each non-symmetric coalition structure P 2 with P 6 = P N ; P I , there exists S 2 P such that u i (P I ) > u i (P) for any i 2 S, then the grand coalition structure P N is the unique coalition structure in the largest consistent set. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) also proposed a re…nement of the largest consistent set called the largest cautious consistent set based on the assumption of players being cautious:
. Then Z k (k = 1; 2; :::) is inductively de…ned as follows: P 2 Z k 1 belongs to Z k 1 if and only if for all P 0 2 nP such that P 0 is obtainable from P via Q, there exists = ( (P 1 ); ::; (P m )) satisfying P m j=1 (P j ) = 1; (P j ) 2 (0; 1); that gives only positive weight to each P j 2 Z k 1 , where P j = P 0 or P j indirectly dominates P 0 , such that we do not have
The largest cautious consistent set is \ k 1 Z k . Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) showed that the largest cautious consistent set singles out the e¢ cient grand coalition structure P N . However, P N may not be sequentially stable with restricted coalitional changes. We will show this fact for common pool resource games in Section 3 and for Cournot oligopoly games in Section 4.
In this subsection, we provide su¢ cient conditions for the grand coalition structure to be sequentially stable in coalition formation games. Theorem 1. Consider any coalition formation game (N; ; (u i ) i2N ) satisfying equal sharing, negative association, positive spillovers, and e¢ ciency. Let n = 2 m + l, where m 2 and 0 l 2 m 1. If the inequalities (a) u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all P with jPj = 2 m h 1 + 2 and for all i 2 S 2 P with jSj = 2 h 1 (h = 1; 2; :::; m 1) (b) u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all P with jPj = 2; and all i 2 S 2 P such that jSj = 2 m 1 hold, then the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable.
4
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix. To see why the conditions in Theorem 1 are su¢ cient for the grand coalition structure P N to be sequentially stable, let us consider the eight-person case as an example. The proof consists of 4 steps:
Step 1: The grand coalition structure P N sequentially dominates some key coalition structure P = f1; 1; 2; ::; 2; 2 m 1 +lg consisting of 2 m 2 +2 coalitions, where n = 2 m +l. For n = 8, m = 3, l = 0, and P = f1; 1; 2; 4g. See Figure 2 . Consider the sequence f1; 1; 2; 4g ! f2; 2; 4g ! f4; 4g ! f8g. At the …rst step of this sequence, two singleton coalitions merge into one 2-person coalition and this bilateral merger makes both players better o¤ in the end of the sequence, f8g, by condition (a) in 4 In Theorem 1, e¢ ciency can be replaced by the following condition of symmetry among coalitions: for any P; P 0 2 with jPj = jP 0 j, any S 2 P, and any S 0 2 P 0 , if jSj = jS 0 j, then u i (P) = u j (P 0 ) for any i 2 S and any j 2 S 0 . This condition says that under two coalition structures consisting of the same number of coalitions, all players who belong to coalitions comprising the same number of players receive the same payo¤. Under this condition, equal sharing, negative association, and condition (a), the payo¤ of each person in any coalition of the maximal size under any coalition structure is smaller than that under the grand coalition structure. The proof is available upon request.
Theorem 1 for m = 3 and h = 1. Notice that jf1; 1; 2; 4gj = 4. At the second step, two 2-person coalitions merge into one 4-person coalition and they become better-o¤ by this merger in the …nal coalition structure f8g by condition (a) for m = 3 and h = 2. Notice that jf2; 2; 4gj = 3. At the third step, two 4-person coalitions merge into the grand coalition and this merger makes all players better o¤ by condition (b) for m = 3. In this way, conditions (a) and (b) guarantee that P N sequentially dominates P .
Step 2: Every coalition structure P such that jPj = jP j is sequentially dominated by P N . For example, let us examine f1; 1; 1; 5g consisting jP j = 4 coalitions. Consider the sequence f1; 1; 1; 5g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 4g ! f1; 1; 2; 4g. At the …rst step of this sequence, one person in the 5-person coalition of the maximal size deviates and forms a singleton coalition. It is easy to see from equal sharing, negative association, and e¢ ciency that this person prefers his/her payo¤ in f8g to that in f1; 1; 1; 5g. At the second step, two singletons merge into one coalition, and they prefer their payo¤s in f8g to that in f1; 1; 1; 1; 4g. The reason is as follows. Condition (a) for m = 3 and h = 1 implies that the payo¤ of every singleton player in any P with jPj = 4 is smaller than that in f8g. This fact together with positive spillovers imply that every singleton player prefers his/her payo¤ in f8g to that in any P 0 with jP 0 j > 4. By combining the above sequence and the sequence in Step 1, we have the dominance sequence from f1; 1; 1; 5g to f8g.
Step 3: Every coalition structure P such that jPj < jP j other than P N is sequentially dominated by P N . For instance, let us examine f1; 7g consisting two coalitions. Consider the sequence f1; 7g ! f1; 1; 6g ! f1; 1; 1; 5g. At the …rst (second) step of this sequence, one person in the seven-person (six-person) coalition of the maximal size deviates and forms a singleton coalition, and this person prefers his/her payo¤ in f8g to that in f1; 7g (f1; 1; 6g) by equal sharing, negative association, and e¢ ciency. By combining this sequence, the sequence in Step 2, and the sequence in Step 1, we have the dominance sequence from f1; 7g to f8g.
Step 4: Every coalition structure P such that jPj > jP j = 4 is sequentially dominated by P N . For example, let us examine f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g consisting eight singleton coalitions. Consider the sequence f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 2g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 2; 2g ! f1; 1; 2; 2; 2g ! f1; 1; 2; 2; 4g. At each step of this sequence, two coalitions merge into one coalition, and each player in the merged coalition prefer his/her payo¤ in f8g to that before the merger. The reason is as follows. Condition (a) for m = 3 and h = 1 together with positive spillovers imply that the payo¤ of every singleton player under any coalition structure P containing more than jP j = 4 coalitions is smaller than that under f8g, as shown in Step 2. This fact and negative association together yield that the payo¤ of every player in any coalition under P with jP j > 4 is smaller than that under P N . By combining the above sequence and the sequence in Step 1, we have the dominance sequence from f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g to f8g.
In a similar way, we can construct a dominance sequence from any other coalition structure to the grand coalition structure via the key coalition structure P = f1; 1; 2; 4g, as illustrated in Figure 2 .
We remark that the conditions (a) and (b) are only used to ensure that players become better o¤ at the …nal grand coalition structure by mergers of two coalitions. Theorem 1 holds even when any change of coalition structure is possible in breakingup, whereas only bilateral changes are feasible in merging.
We apply Theorem 1 to common pool resource games in the next section.
Common Pool Resource Games
Let us consider the following model of an economy with a common pool resource as examined by Weitzman (1974) and others. For each player i 2 N , let x i 0 represent the amount of labor input of i. The overall amount of labor is given by P j2N x j . The technology that determines the amount of product is considered to be a joint production function of the overall amount of labor f :
, and f 00 (x) < 0 for x > 0. The distribution of the product is supposed to be proportional to the amount of labor expended by players. In other words, the amount of the product assigned to player i is given by
. The price of the product is normalized to be one unit of money and let q be a cost of labor per unit, and we suppose 0 < q < f 0 (0). Then individual i's income is denoted by m i (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) =
f (x N ) qx S , where x S P i2S x i . We consider a game where each coalition acts as a player. Each coalition chooses its total labor input and its payo¤ is given by the sum of the income over its members. The list (x S 1 ; x S 2 ; :::; x S k ) is a Nash equilibrium or simply an equilibrium under P if m S j (x S j ; x S j ) m S j (x S j ; x S j ) for all j and all x S j 2 IR + . It is not hard to check that there is a unique equilibrium under every coalition structure.
5 Given a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; :::; S k g, let (x S 1 (P); :::; x S k (P)) be a unique equilibrium under P and let x N (P) = P k i=1 x S i (P). Moreover, let m S i (P) = m S i (x S 1 (P); :::; x S k (P)) be the equilibrium income of coalition S i for i = 1; ::; k and therefore m N (P) = P k i=1 m S i (x S 1 (P); :::; x S k (P)). We assume that the payo¤ vector is given by u i (P) = m S j (P)
for all i 2 S j and all S j 2 P. We examine the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure P N in common pool resource games. First, let us consider the following example to illustrate the basic idea.
Example 2. Let n = 2; 3; ::; 8. The production function is given by f (x) = x , 2 (0; 1). It is easy to see that for each P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g where k is a number of coalitions in P, the total amount of labor input is given by x N (P) = 1+k kq 1=(1 ) and the payo¤ of each player at equilibrium is provided by 5 See Theorem 1 in Funaki and Yamato (1999) .
; 8i 2 S j ; 8j = 1; ::; k; (5:1)
By using the algorithm in the previous section, we can check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure P N . Whether P N is sequentially stable depends on the number of players, n; as well as on the value of production function parameter,
. Table 1 summarizes the result. Let (n) be 2 (0; 1) such that 1 n ( )
, where k = 2 for n = 3, k = 3 for n = 5; 6; 7, and k = 4 for n = 8. Suppose that < (5) 0:704302, implying that u i (f5g) > max i2N u i (f1; 1; 3g) = max i2N u i (f1; 2; 2g) and u i (f5g) > u i (f2; 3g) for i 2 N . Then we can show that P N = f5g is sequentially stable by using the same argument as that in Example 1 in which the payo¤s are based on the values of equation (5:1) for = 0:5 and q = 1=200. On the other hand, if (5), then u i (f5g) max i2N u i (f1; 1; 3g) = max i2N u i (f1; 2; 2g) for i 2 N , implying that Step 2 in Example 1 does not hold, that is, (3) = ?. Hence, P N = f5g is not sequentially stable. In a similar way, we can prove the results described in Table 1 for n = 2; 3; 4; 6; 7; 8. The proof is available upon request.
As Table 1 illustrates, the e¢ cient grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable for a su¢ ciently smaller value of . As the marginal productivity increases, the gain by a deviation from P N becomes greater, so that it is more di¢ cult to achieve e¢ ciency for a larger value of 2 (0; 1).
Given any common pool resource game, we can check the sequential stability of the e¢ cient grand coalition structure P N by using the algorithm in Section 2, but it becomes more complicated as the number of players n increases. In order to obtain a general result for an arbitrary number of players, we apply Theorem 1 on su¢ cient conditions for the sequentially stability of P N which are relatively easy to check. In particular, we …nd that when the production function is given by a power function, f (x) = x , for any number of players, there exists 2 (0; 1) such that P N is sequentially stable for < :
Let a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g with jPj = k be given. It is easy to see that for j = 1; :::; k, the payo¤ of player i 2 S j is given by
6 This implies that for any P with jPj = k 2, any S j 2 P, and any i 2 S j , u i (P) < u i (P N ) if and only if B(k) < jS j j =n, where
. By using this relation and Theorem 1, we obtain su¢ cient conditions of the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure in a common pool resource game: hold, then the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable in a common pool resource game.
The proofs of all results in this section are in the appendix. If the production function is given by f (x) = x (0 < < 1), then we have the following result:
Theorem 3. Consider a common pool resource game in which the production function is given by f (x) = x , 2 (0; 1): For any number of players, n, there exists 2 (0; 1) such that the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable for < :
Theorem 3 says that for any number of players, there is a class of concave production functions for which the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. In fact, as Table 1 illustrates, there may be a large region of for which P N is sequentially stable.
Coalition structures other than the grand coalition structure could be sequentially stable in a common pool resource game. For example, in a 6-person game with f (x) = p x, the coalition structures consisting of (n 1)-person coalition and oneperson coalition, P N nfig = ffig; N nfigg(i 2 N ) are also sequentially stable. However, such a coalition structure is quite unfair in the sense that the payo¤ of the player in one-person coalition is equal to the sum of all other players' payo¤s. We examine under which condition these unfair coalition structures are not sequentially stable.
, then the coalition structures P N nfig = ffig; N n figg (i 2 N ) are not sequentially stable in a common pool resource game.
By applying Proposition 2 to the case in which the production function is give by f (x) = x (0 < < 1), we have the following: Corollary 2. Let n 5. If f (x) = x and 0:583804, then the coalition structures P N nfig = ffig; N n figg, (fig 2 N ) are not sequentially stable in a common pool resource game.
The above result shows that for any number of players, the unfair coalition structures P N nfig = ffig; N n figg is not sequentially stable if is suitably large. 6 See Theorem 1 in Funaki and Yamato (1999) . 7 The unfair coalition structure P N nfig = ffig; N n figg may indirectly dominates any other coalition structure and hence the singleton set fP N nfig g may be a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
Cournot Oligopoly Games
In this section, we study the following Cournot oligopoly game with n identical …rms producing a homogeneous good. Let x i be …rm i's output (i = 1; ::; n) and p be its price. The inverse demand function is linear: p = a ( P n i=1 x i ), a > c > 0. The total cost function of …rm i is cx i . Given a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g, we assume that each coalition S j is a player who chooses the total output level of its …rms to maximize the sum of their pro…ts, given the output levels of other coalitions. Also, every coalition is supposed to divide its pro…t equally among its members.
It is not hard to check that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium under each coalition structure. The total equilibrium output under a given coalition structure P is given by x N (P) = k(a c)=(k + 1) and the pro…t of each …rm in coalition S j belonging to P are provided by u i (P) = ((a c)=(k + 1)) 2 = jS j j for each i 2 S j and each j 2 f1; ::; kg, where k = jPj. Without loss of generality, we assume that a c = 1. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) showed that many coalition structures including the e¢ cient grand coalition structure P N may belong to the largest consistent set, whereas the largest cautious consistent set singles out P N under no restriction on possible deviations in Cournot oligopoly games. On the other hand, we …nd that P N is not sequentially stable for several cases when only bilateral mergers of two coalitions are possible. Table 2 summarizes the results regarding the sequential stability of P N for n less than or equal to 40. The proof is available upon request. stable set (an EEBA) and a farsightedly stable set. It is di¢ cult to eliminate this possibility because the singleton player gets the maximal payo¤ among the payo¤s under all coalition structures, and the singleton coalition structure P I can merge into P N nfig directly at one step.
Extensions
The negative results in the previous sections regarding the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure could be overcome if the merger of all one-player coalitions into the grand coalition was allowed because of little negotiation or transaction costs. In fact, Herings et al. (2010) established that under the conditions of equal sharing, positive spillovers, negative association, and e¢ ciency, the e¢ cient grand coalition structure indirectly dominates any other coalition structure when this merger is possible. However, we …nd that the merger of all n singleton coalitions into the grand coalition is not necessary and a merger of a smaller number of coalitions is enough for the e¢ cient grand coalition structure to be stable among farsighted players. In this section, we identify how many coalitions should merge into one coalition at each step of sequential domination to achieve e¢ ciency in common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games. We introduce the following de…nitions which are generalizations of De…nitions 1-3. Let coalition structures P; P 0 2 with P 6 = P 0 and a coalition Q N with Q 6 = ? be given. De…nition 15. Let m and b be integers between 2 and n. We say that P sequentially dominates P 0 under mergers of at most m coalitions and breakups into at most b coalitions if there is a …nite sequence of coalition structures fP t g T t=0 such that (1) P 0 = P 0 and P T = P, (2) for any t 2 f0; 1; :::; T 1g, P t+1 is obtainable from P t via some coalition Q either by a merger of m coalitions or by a breakup into b coalitions where m m and b b, and u i (P t ) < u i (P T ) for all i 2 Q.
De…nition 16. Let m and b be integers between 2 and n. We say that the coalition structure P s 2 is m b sequentially stable if for all other coalition structures P 6 = P s , P s sequentially dominates P under mergers of at most m coalitions and breakups into at most b coalitions. 8 We obtain the following result on this generalized stability concept for a common pool resource game:
Theorem 4. Consider a common pool resource game in which the production function is given by f (x) = x , 2 (0; 1). Let n 2 and b be any integer between 2 and n. The grand coalition structure is m b sequentially stable if m is the smallest integer satisfying m 2 m 1+m
The proofs of all results in this section are in the appendix. As the number of players n increases, m increases, but the ratio m=n; that is, the relative size of mergers enough to achieve e¢ ciency tends to become smaller. In addition, m becomes larger as increases, that is, the marginal productivity becomes larger. The following table illustrates these facts: 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 11 23 33
Concerning a Cournot oligopoly game with linear demand, we have the following:
Theorem 5. Consider a Cournot oligopoly game in which the inverse demand function is given by p = a P n i=1 x i . Let n 2 and b be any integer between 2 and n. The grand coalition structure is m b sequentially stable if m is the smallest integer satisfying m 2 m+1 2m 2 > n.
As the number of …rms n increases, m increases, but the ratio m=n, that is, the relative size of mergers enough to achieve e¢ ciency tends to become smaller. The following table illustrates this fact: n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50 100 500 1000 m 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 8 10 12 14 19 44 63
Notice that the condition in Theorem 5 is su¢ cient for the grand coalition to be sequentially stable, but not necessary. For example, if n = 40, then the grand coalition structure is 2 2 stable (see Table 2 ), but m = 12.
We also remark that the su¢ cient conditions for the generalized sequential stability in Theorems 4 and 5 depends only on m, the maximal number of coalitions that can be merged, but not on b, the maximal number of coalitions that can be broken up.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose a sequentially stable coalition structure as a new concept of stability in coalition formation games if only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. By using our algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure P N and su¢ cient conditions for P N to be sequentially stable, we …nd how the sequential stability of P N depends on the number of players and the production function in common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games. We also identify how many coalitions should merge into one coalition at each step of sequential domination to achieve e¢ ciency in those games.
There are several open questions. Fist of all, we focus on checking the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure. It remains to investigate a condition for the existence of sequentially stable structures other than the grand coalition structure. In a Cournot oligopoly game with linear demand, no sequentially stable coalition structure may exist. Nevertheless, the e¢ cient grand coalition becomes sequentially stable if mergers of many coalitions are allowed. It would be interesting to examine how large mergers should be allowed to achieve e¢ ciency in other environments.
Moreover, the feasible payo¤ vector is assumed to be uniquely determined for each coalition structure in this paper. In a more general case, there could be a set of multiple feasible payo¤ vectors for a coalition structure. Then it is not easy to compare the present payo¤ to the …nal payo¤ because of the multiplicity of the feasible payo¤ vectors. We should take account of sequential domination between two feasible payo¤ vectors in the same coalition structure. This topic is also left for a future research.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
In the following, we denote a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; :::; S k g, where jS 1 j = r 1 jS 2 j = r 2 jS 3 j = r 3 ::: jS k j = r k , by fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k g, because payo¤s are determined by the sizes of all coalitions in a coalition structure by equal sharing and negative association. Consider a coalition structure P = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2; ::::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg consisting of 2 m 2 + 2 coalitions. Let k = 2 m 2 + 2. We say that P is a k-th stage coalition structure if jPj = k. The proof consists of four steps.
(Step 1) P is sequentially dominated by P N . We have to …nd a sequence of coalition structures fP t g k t=1 from P 1 = P to P k = P N , where the two coalitions of the smallest size in P t merge into one coalition in P t+1 for t = 1; 2; :::; 2 m 2 + 1. We will show the following is a domination sequence of coalition structures. P = P 1 = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2; 2; :::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg ((2 m 2 + 2)-th stage)
! P 2 = f2; 2; 2; 2; 2; 2; :::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg ((2 m 2 + 1)-th stage)
! P 3 = f4; 2; 2; 2; 2; :::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg (2 m 2 -th stage)
! P 4 = f4; 4; 2; :::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg ((2 ! :::: ! ::::
For t = 1, the payo¤ of every player in the two singletons under P 1 is smaller than that under the …nal coalition structure P N by condition (a) for h = 1 in Theorem 1. Remark that jP 1 j = 2 m 2 + 2. For t = 2; 3; :::; 2 m 3 + 1, the payo¤ of every player in every 2-person coalition whose size is the minimal among the coalitions under P t is smaller than that under the …nal coalition structure P N . Remark that jP 2 m 3 +1 j = 2 m 3 + 2 < jP t j for all t 2 f2; 3; :::; 2 m 3 g. Equal sharing, condition (a) for h = 2; and positive spillovers together imply that
for all i 2 S such that S 2 P 2 m 3 +1 and jSj = 2, all j 2 S such that S 2 P t and jSj = 2, and all t 2 f2; 3; :::; 2 m 3 g. For t = 2 m 3 + 2; 2 m 3 + 3; :::; 2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + 1, the payo¤ of every player in 4-person coalitions under P t is smaller than that under the …nal coalition structure P N : Remark that jP 2 m 3 +3+2 m 4 +1 j = 2 m 4 + 2 < jP t j for all t 2 f2 m 3 + 2; 2 m 3 + 3; :::; 2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + 1g. Equal sharing, condition (a) for h = 3, and positive spillovers together imply that u j (P N ) = u i (P N ) > u i (P 2 m 3 +3+2 m 4 +1 ) > u j (P t ) for all i 2 S such that S 2 P 2 m 3 +3+2 m 4 +1 and jSj = 4, all j 2 S such that S 2 P t and jSj = 4, and all t 2 f2 m 3 + 2; 2 m 3 + 3; :::; 2 m 3 + 3 + 2 m 4 g. Let h 2 f4; :::; m 3g. For t = (2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + ::: + 2 m h ) + 2; (2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + ::: + 2 m h ) + 3; :::; (2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + ::: + 2 m h ) + 2 m h 1 + 1, the payo¤ of every member in 2 h 1 -person coalitions under P t is smaller than that under P N . Remark that jP (2 m 3 +2 m 4 +:::+2 m h )+2 m h 1 +1 j = 2 m h 1 + 2 < jP t j for all t 2 f(2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + ::: + 2 m h ) + 2; (2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + ::: + 2 m h ) + 3; :::; (2 m 3 + 2 m 4 + ::: + 2 m h ) + 2 m h 1 + 1g. Equal sharing, condition (a), and positive spillovers together imply that u j (P N ) = u i (P N ) > u i (P (2 m 3 +2 m 4 +:::+2 m h )+2 m h 1 +1 ) > u j (P t ) for all i 2 S such that S 2 P (2 m 3 +2 m 4 +:::+2 m h )+2 m h 1 +1 and jSj = 2 h 1 ; all j 2 S such that S 2 P t and jSj = 2 1, which correspond to the case of h = m 2 above, the payo¤ of every member in two 2 m 3 -person coalitions under P 2 m 2 2 and P 2 m 2 1 is smaller than that under P N . Remark that jP 2 m 2 1 j = 4 < jP 2 m 2 2 j = 5. Equal sharing, condition (a) for h = m 2; and positive spillovers together imply that
2 ) for all i 2 S such that S 2 P 2 m 2 1 and jSj = 2 m 3 and all j 2 S such that S 2 P 2 m 2 2 and jSj = 2 m 3 . For t = 2 m 2 , the payo¤ of every member in two 2 m 2 -person coalitions under P 2 m 2 is smaller than that under P N by condition (a) for h = m 1. Remark that jP 2 m 2 j = 3:
For t = 2 m 2 + 1, the payo¤ of every member in the two coalitions under P 2 m 2 +1 is smaller than that under P N . Remark that jP 2 m 2 +1 j = 2. Equal sharing, condition (b), and negative association together imply that u j (P N ) = u i (P N ) > u i (P 2 m 2 +1 ) u j (P 2 m 2 +1 ) for all i 2 S such that jSj = 2 m 1 and all i 2 T such that jT j = 2 m 1 + l. Therefore, the k -th stage coalition structure P 1 = P is sequentially dominated by P N .
(
Step 2) Every k -th stage coalition structure is sequentially dominated by P N . Take any k -th stage coalition structure P. Here k = 2 m 2 + 2. First we consider a sequence fP t g T t=0 such that 1) P 0 = P = fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k 2 ; r k 1 ; r k g (r 1 r 2 r 3 ::: r k 1 r k ).
2) P T = f1; 1; 1; :::; 1; n k + 1g, where jP T j = k . 3) If t is zero or even, then a single player belonging to the largest coalition in P t deviates and forms one person coalition in P t+1 . 4) If t is odd, then the largest and the second largest coalitions in P t merge into one coalition in P t+1 .
Then the sequence fP t g T t=0 of coalition structures is given by: P 0 = fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k 2 ; r k 1 ; r k g (k -th stage) ! P 1 = f1; r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k 2 ; r k 1 ; r k 1g ((k + 1)-th stage)
! P 2 = f1; r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k 2 ; r k 1 + r k 1g (k -th stage)
! P 3 = f1; 1; r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k 2 ; r k 1 + r k 2g ( t=T such that 1) P T = f1; 1; 1; :::; 1; n k + 1g, 2) P T +T 0 = P = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2; :::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg. 3) If t = T + and is 0 or even, then a single player in the largest coalition in P T + deviates and form a singleton in P T + +1 .
4) If t = T + and is odd, then two singletons in P T + merge into one coalition in P T + +1 .
This sequence fP t g
t=T of coalition structures is given by: P T = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; n k + 1g (k -th stage) ! P T +1 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; 1; n k g ((k + 1)-th stage) ! P T +2 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 2; n k g (k -th stage) ! P T +3 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; 2; n k 1g ((k + 1)-th stage)
! P T +4 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 2; 2; n k 1g k -th stage)
! P T +5 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 2; 2; n k 2g ((k + 1)-th stage)
! ::: ! :::
! P T +T 0 2 = f1; 1; 1; 2; :::; 2; 2; n 2k + 3g k -th stage)
! P T +T 0 1 = f1; 1; 1; 1; 2; :::; 2; 2; n 2k + 4g (k + 1)-th stage)
! P T +T 0 = f1; 1; 2; 2; :::; 2; 2; n 2k + 4g = f1; 1; 2; 2; :::; 2; 2; 2 m 1 + lg
By combining two sequences fP t g T t=0 and fP t g
t=T , we get a sequence fP t g
from any k -th stage coalition structure P = P 0 to P = P T +T 0 . For t = 0; 2; 4; :::; T; T + 2; T + 4; :::; T + T 0 2, a single player belonging to the largest coalition in P t deviates and forms one person coalition P t+1 . The payo¤ of this single deviating player under P N is larger than that under P t because equal sharing, negative association, and e¢ ciency together imply that for all P 2 with P 6 = P N , u i (P N ) > u i (P) for all i 2 S such that S 2 P and jSj jT j for all T 2 P (A.1)
For t = 1; 3; 5; :::; T 1, the largest coalition S 1 and the second largest coalition S 2 in P t merge into one coalition in P t+1 . By condition (a) for h = 1, the payo¤ of every singleton player under any coalition structure P with jPj = 2 m 2 + 2 = k is smaller than that under P N . Since jP t j = k + 1 = 2 m 2 + 3 > k , it follows from positive spillovers that any singleton player prefers his/her payo¤ under P N to that under P t , that is, u i (P N ) > u i (P t ) for all i 2 S such that S 2 P t and jSj = 1. (A.2) This fact together with equal sharing and negative association imply that
for all i 2 S with jSj = 1, all j 2 S 1 , and all k 2 S 2 , where jS 1 j jS 2 j 1. In other words, the payo¤ of each player belonging to the merged coalition S 1 [ S 2 under P t is smaller than that under P N . For t = T + 1; T + 3; T + 5; :::; T + T 0 1, two singleton coalitions in P t merge into one coalition in P t+1 . Since jP t j = k + 1 = 2 m 2 + 3 > k , we again have the above inequalities (A.2). Therefore, each member in the merged coalition receives a higher payo¤ under P N than under P t . Moreover, by Step 1, P T +T 0 = P is sequentially dominated by P N . These facts together imply that every k -th stage coalition structure P = P 0 is sequentially dominated by P N .
Step 3) Every k-th coalition structure P with 1 < k < k = 2 m 2 + 2 is sequentially dominated by P N .
Take any coalition structure P of less than k coalitions other than P N . Consider the following sequence fP t g starting from P to some k -th stage coalition structure P 0 : one person in a coalition of the maximal size in P t deviates and forms a singleton in P t+1 . By (A.1) in Step 2, each person in a coalition of the maximal size in P t prefers his/her payo¤ under P N to that under P t . Moreover, it is easy to construct a sequence of coalition structures from P to P N by combining the above sequence from P to P 0 , the sequence from P 0 to P in Step 2, and the sequence from P to P N in Step 1. These imply that P is sequentially dominated by P N .
Step 4) Every k-th coalition structure P with n k > k = 2 m 2 + 2 is sequentially dominated by P N . Take any k-th stage coalition structure P such that n k > k = 2 m 2 + 2. Condition (a) for h = 1 together with positive spillovers imply that the payo¤ of every singleton player under P is smaller than that under P N . This fact and negative association together yield that the payo¤ of every player in any coalition under P is smaller than that under P N . Consider any sequence fP t g starting from P to some k -th stage coalition structure P 0 such that two coalitions in P t merge into one coalition in P t+1 . Notice that each member in these two coalitions in P t prefers his/her payo¤ under P N to that under P t , as shown above. Moreover, it is easy to construct a sequence of coalition structures from P to P N by combining the above sequence from P to P 0 , the sequence from P 0 to P in Step 2, and the sequence from P to P N in Step 1. These imply that P is sequentially dominated by P N .
Steps 1-4 show that every coalition structure other than P N is sequentially dominated by P N . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
In what follows, we denote a coalition structure by P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; :::; S k g, where jS 1 j = r 1 jS 2 j = r 2 jS 3 j = r 3 ::: jS k j = r k . We begin by proving the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let P 2 be given. Then we have:
: [ S k if and only if B(k) < r 3 =n; ...; and (k) u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 S k if and only if B(k) < r k =n.
Proof. It is easy to see that
2 ) for i 2 S j and j = 1; :::; k (see Theorem 1 in Funaki and Yamato (1999) ). Notice that for the grand coalition structure P N , k = 1 and r 1 = n, so that
We also remark that a player belonging to the smallest coalition, S 1 , obtains the highest payo¤ among all players, that is, the payo¤ of each player i, u i (P), is less than or equal to u j (P) = m S 1 (P)=r 1 for j 2 S 1 . Therefore, u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 N if and only if
In similar, note that a player belonging to the smallest coalition, S 2 , among the coalitions, S 2 ; S 3 ; ::; S k , obtains the highest payo¤ among players in those k 1 coalitions, that is, the payo¤ of each player i 2 S 2 [ S 3 [ ::: [ S k , u i (P), is less than or equal to u j (P) = m S 2 (P)=r 2 for j 2 S 2 . Hence,
A similar argument works for the case of B(k) < r 3 =n; ::; and B(k) < r k =n. Q.E.D.
It is easy to verify that any common pool resource game satis…es equal sharing, negative association, and positive spillovers. Next we prove that it also satis…es conditions (a) and (b).
Take any coalition structure P with jPj = 2. Consider a case that P = fS 1 ; S 2 g such that r 1 = 2 m 1 and r 2 = 2 m 1 + l. Then B(2) < 2 m 1 n implies B(2) < r 1 n . Lemma 1 implies u i (P) < u i (P N ) for all i 2 N . This shows condition (b) in Theorem 1. For any h = 1; 2; :::; m 1, take any coalition structure P with jPj = 2 m h 1 + 2. Suppose there is a coalition S 2 P such that jSj = 2 h 1 . Then S is equal to some S p for p; 1 p k. It is not hard to see that for two coalition structures P k = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g and P Funaki and Yamato (1999) ). Since 
Proof of Theorem 3
First of all, note that
) . In addition, lim !0 B(k) = 1=k 2 for any k. Hence for su¢ ciently small > 0, B(k) is very close to 1=k 2 .
Suppose that n 4. Let n = 2 m + l. Given m 2, consider any integer n 2 [2 m ; 2 m+1 ). First we will show that lim !0 B(2 m h 1 + 2) = 1=(2 m h 1 + 2) 2 < 2 h 1 =n for h = 1; :::; m 1.
is an increasing function of . It follows from Theorem 2 that there exists 2 (0; 1) such that the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable for < . For n 3, see Table 1 in Section 4.2 indicating the region of for which P N is sequentially stable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
We will show that any coalition structure containing three coalitions is not sequentially dominated by P N nfig if C(3) 9 8
. Let P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 g, jS 1 j jS 2 j jS 3 j, be a coalition structure containing 3 coalitions. In any sequence from P to P N nfig , two coalitions must merge into one coalition. Thus it is enough to show that the payo¤ of each player in one of two coalitions is smaller than the payo¤ in the coalition N n fig  of P N nfig . Hence, if the largest payo¤ of a player in the second largest S 2 among all coalition structures with 3 coalitions is smaller than the payo¤ of a player in N n fig, we can attain our purpose. Then we have to compare the payo¤ m j (P) of player j in a coalition S 2 of the smallest size with the payo¤ m j (P N nfig ). Remark that such a coalition structure is given by jS 1 j = 1 and jS 2 j = jS 3 j = (n 1)=2 if n is odd, and jS 1 j = 1, jS 2 j = (n 2)=2, jS 3 j = (n + 2)=2 if n is even. The payo¤ of each player j 2 S 2 is given by m j (P) = [f (x N (P)) f 0 (x N (P))x N (P)] =(9r 2 ), and the payo¤ of each player j 2 N nfig is given by m j (P N nfig ) = f (x N (P N nfig )) f 0 (x N (P N nfig ))x N (P N nfig ) =(4(n 1)). Note that for j 2 S 2 , m j (P) m j (P N nfig ) i¤ [4(n 1)=(9r 2 )]ff (x N (P)) f 0 (x N (P))x N (P)g=ff (x N (P N nfig )) f 0 (x N (P N nfig ))x N (P N nfig )g = [4(n 1)=(9r 2 )]C(3) 1.
There are two cases to examine. First, if n is even, then for P 2 with r 2 = (n 2)=2, 4(n 1)=(9r 2 ) = 8(n 1)=[9(n 2)], so that if C(3) 9=8, then m j (P) > m j (P N nfig ). Second, if n is odd, then for P 2 with r 2 = (n 1)=2, 4(n 1)=(9r 2 ) = 8=9, so that if C(3) 9=8, then m j (P) m j (P N nfig ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2
It is easy to see that C(3) = 3( +1) 2( +2)
=(1 )
. It is not hard to check that 1=C(3) = 
Proof of Theorem 4
The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: Take any coalition structure P with jPj = m. Every player gets a higher payo¤ under the grand coalition structure P N than under P because for all i 2 N , = max j2N u j (P 0 ) max j2N u j (P) u i (P), where P 0 is a coalition structure containing at least one singleton coalition of only one player and jP 0 j = m. 9 Therefore, P N sequentially dominates P when mergers of m coalitions are possible.
Step 2: Take any coalition structure P with m + 1 jPj n. Notice that for every coalition structure P with jPj = k, there are S 0 ; S 00 2P and S 2P 0 such that 9 For example, consider P 0 = f1; 1; ::; 1; n m + 1g, that is, the coalition structure consisting of m 1 one-person coalitions and one coalition of n m + 1 persons. Note that each player in the one-person coalitions get the highest payo¤, , under P 0 .
S 0 [ S 00 = S and jP 0 j = k 1. Therefore, there are a coalition structure P 0 with jP 0 j = m and a sequence of coalition structures from P to P 0 through bilateral mergers of two coalitions at each step. Moreover, for all S; S 0 2 P and all i 2 S [ S 0 , u i (P) < u i (P N ), because u i (P N ) = = max j2N u j (P 00 ) max j2N u j (P) u i (P), where P 00 is a coalition structure containing at least one coalition of only one player and jP 00 j = jPj > m. That is, the payo¤ of each member in any pair of coalitions under P is smaller than that under P N . By combining the above sequence and the sequence in Step 1, we have the sequence from P to P N and P N sequentially dominates P when mergers of two coalitions are possible.
Step 3: Take any coalition structure P with 2 jPj m 1. Consider a sequence of coalition structures from P to a coalition structure P 0 with jP 0 j = m; fP t g m 2
t=0
; such that a single player belonging to the largest coalition in P t deviates and forms one person coalition in P t+1 at each step t. By using Lemma 1 in the appendix, it is easy to check that this person in a coalition of the maximize size in P t prefers his/her payo¤ under P N to that under P t . By combining the above sequence and the sequence in Step 1, we have the sequence from P to P N and P N sequentially dominates P when mergers of m coalitions and breakups into two coalitions are possible.
Therefore, P N is m b sequentially stable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5
Step 1: Take any coalition structure P with jPj = m. Every …rm gets a higher payo¤ under P N than under P because for all i 2 N , u i (P N ) = ) 2 = max j2N u j (P 0 ) max j2N u j (P) u i (P), where P 0 is a coalition structure containing at least one singleton coalition of only one player and jP 0 j = m. Therefore, P N sequentially dominates P when mergers of m coalitions are possible.
Step 2: Take any coalition structure P with m + 1 jPj n. It is easy to construct a sequence of coalition structures from P to some coalition structure P 0 with jP 0 j = m through bilateral mergers of two coalitions at each step. Moreover, for all S; S 0 2 P and all i 2 S [ S 0 , u i (P) < u i (P N ), because u i (P N ) = = max j2N u j (P 00 ) max j2N u j (P) u i (P), where P 00 is a coalition structure containing at least one coalition of only one player and jP 00 j = jPj > m.
By combining the above sequence and the sequence in Step 1, we have the sequence from P to P N and P N sequentially dominates P when mergers of two coalitions are possible.
We omit the rest of the proof that is similar to Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 4. Q.E.D. 
